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The Fifth Amendment's Takings
Clause: New Twists to an
Evolving Doctrine
by James E. Haupt, III

INTRODUCTION
Whether a governmental action is a taking depends upon which taking test is
applied to a case. There is no set taking
standard by which an alleged taking is to
be judged because the United States
Supreme Court .has not yet established
one. This paper will attempt to trace the
history of the taking issue. This paper will
also focus on Maryland's Chesapeake Bay
Critical Area Legislation and its relationship to the takings question.

A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT'S TAKING THEORIES
In order to properly evaluate the effect
of governmental action as it relates to
private property, a brief historical overview is necessary to explain the United
States Supreme Court's approach to the
question of what constitutes a taking of
property.
Eminent domain is the power of the
government to take privately owned property, upon the payment of adequate compensation, to the use of the public benefit.
This is different from the police power
which refers to the inherent power of the
government to take action in order to prevent harm to the public health, safety, welfare or morals (known as inverse
condemnation).· A problem arises when
governmental action via police power
regulation is claimed to violate the Just
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amend-

ment.2
The early test for a taking was formulated
in J,fug/er '0. Kansas, 3 wherein the government action must have been deemed an
actual, physical, appropriation of the property. In J,fug/er, a state statute prohibited
the sale and manufacture of liquor for purposes other than medical, scientific and
mechanical uses. The breweries argued that
their businesses were erected prior to the
passage of the statute and, if the statute
were to be applied to them, then their
breweries would have little or no value.
This argument did not sway the Court.
The Court drew the distinction between
the appropriation of property for the public benefit (eminent domain) and the prevention of a public harm (police power):
The power which the states have of
prohibiting such use by individuals of
their property, as will be prejudicial to
the health, the morals, or the safety of
the public, is not [,] and ... cannot be
[,J burdened with the condition that
the state must compensate such individual owners for pecuniary losses they
may sustain, by reason of their not
being permitted, by a noxious use of
their property, to inflict injury upon
the community.4
The modern approach to takings was set
forth in Pennsylvania Coal Co. '0. Mahon. 5
In that case a coal company conveyed a

tract of land to grantees yet reserved its
right to remove coal from under the tract.
Pennsylvania subsequently enacted a statute that prohibited the mining of coal in
any manner that would cause subsidence
of any structure used for human habitation. The Supreme Court, in an opinion
written by Justice Holmes, declared ·the
statute to be an unconstitutional taking of
the company's property. Holmes wrote:

As long recognized, some values are
enjoyed under an implied limitation
and must yield to the police power.
But obviously the implied limitation
must have its limits, or the contract
and due process clauses are gone. One
fact for consideration in determining
such limits is the extent of the diminution. When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not all cases there must
be an exercise of eminent domain and
compensation to sustain the act. 6
Thus emerged the general rule that
"while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if the regulation goes too far it
will be recognized as a taking."7 As a result
of Mahon, the distinction between the
state's exercise of eminent domain and the
police power became blurred.8
Since 1978, the Supreme Court has had
an increasing number of opportunities to
rule on regulatory takings dealing with
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land use regulations. The first opportunity
arose in Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
New York City9 where the owners of
Grand Central Terminal challenged the
New York City Landmark Preservation
Law because of the Commission's rejection of plans for a 55-story highrise office
building above the terminal. The Court
held that the landmark designation did not
constitute a taking because of the existence
of transferable development rights. lo The
decision, set forth factors that bear significance regarding the taking question:
[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and particularly,
the extent to which the regulation has
interfered with distinct investmentbacked expectations ... [and] the character of the governmental action. A
"taking" may more readily be found
when the interference with property
can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from some public
program adjusting the benefits and
burdens of economic life to promote
the common good. II
A taking cannot be claimed merely by
showing that the landowner has been
denied the ability to use his property in a
manner that he had anticipated regarding
its development. '2 In making the taking
determination, the property is not analyzed by segments in order to ascertain
whether a particular segment was taken,
but rather, the governmental action is
scrutinized according to "the nature and
extent of the interference with rights in
the parcel as a whole .... "13
The next major taking issue addressed by
the Supreme Court was in Kaiser Aetna v.
United States. 14 In Kaiser, privately owned
Kaupa pond was physically separated from
a navigable bay and the Pacific Ocean by
a barrier beach. The owners were advised
by the Army Corps of Engineers that no
permit was needed to convert the pond
into a marina and connect it with the bay.
As a result, the United States filed suit to
determine if the Corps of Engineers'
authority would include regulation of
future improvements to the marina, and
whether the owners could deny public
access to the pond since the Corps considered the pond a "navigable water of the
United States."15
The Court held that the pond was a navigable water and, therefore, subject to
regulation by the Corps for any future
improvements. '6 However, the pond
through the navigable servitude did not
automatically become a public aquatic
park. "[T]he 'right to exclude' is universal-

ly held to be a fundamental element of the
property right, .. , [and requires] that the
Government cannot take without [just]
compensation."'7 If the Corps' use of the
navigational servitude was to create a public park then it would "result in an actual
physical invasion of the privately owned
marina," 18 and hence be equivalent to a
taking.
The consequences of downgrading property by a zoning ordinance which created
open space preservation was at issue in
Agins v. City of Tiburon. 19 The property
owners bought five acres of unimproved
land for residential development. Subsequently a zoning change permitted development of one to five houses on the tract
of land. The Court affirmed the Supreme
Court of California's holding that the zoning ordinance on its face did not constitute
a taking. 20 The Court found that the zoning ordinances substantially advanced
legitimate governmental goals while focusing on protecting residents from the
adverse affects of urbanization. 21 Finding
the ordinance constitutional because it
allowed the best use of the property, the
Court noted that the Agins could "pursue
their reasonable investment expectations .... "22

'"'all procedural and
adminstrative
remedies must be
exhausted . .. "

The dicta in the Agins opmlOn later
became a major procedural hurdle for
future petitioners to overcome before
determining how an ordinance should be
applied in a particular case. "Because the
appellants have not submitted a plan for
development of their property as the
ordinances permit, there is as yet no concrete controversy regarding the application of the specific zoning provisions."23
Thus, all procedural and administrative
remedies must be exhausted before asserting a valid takings claim.
Without doubt, however, the most controversial takings issue was decided in San
Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego. 24
This case also involved the downzoning of
property. The city of San Diego changed
local zoning, for part of the subject property, from industrial to agricultural and

established an "open-space" plan. The
takings issue was never reached because
the Court, in a 5 to 4 decision, concluded
that the California Court of Appeals had
not decided whether any taking had in fact
occurred. Therefore, since there was no
final decision, the Court did not have jurisdiction to review the appeal. 25
The controversy surrounding San Diego
Gas & Electric Co. stems from Justice Brennan's dissent, wherein he stated that
"[p]olice power regulations such as zoning
ordinances and other land-use restrictions
can destroy the use and enjoyment of
property to promote the public good just
as effectively as formal condemnation or
physical invasion of property."26 Justice
Brennan concluded that a de facto exercise
of the power of eminent domain could
result where the effects of the government
action "completely deprive the owner of
all or most of his interest in the property."27
Under Brennan's proposed rule, monetary damages would be constitutionally
required once a court established that
there was a regulatory taking. According
to Justice Brennan, the Constitution demands that the government pay just compensation for the period commencing on
the date the regulation first effects the taking and ending on the date the government
chooses to rescind or otherwise amend the
regulation. 28 Not only did Justice Brennan
make it clear that those harmed by a regulatory taking could receive monetary
damages, he also proposed that even
though a regulatory taking may be temporary it still would amount to a constitutional taking. 29
After San Diego Gas & Electric Co., the
Court seemed to return to its more traditional theory of an actual physical intrusion as a result of government action. In

Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV
Corp.,30 the Court again held that a statute
authorizing a permanent physical occupation of private property constituted a taking. 31
Some recent decisions by the Supreme
Court have focused on procedural or
jurisdictional holdings regarding finality of
the case rather than confronting the constitutional question of whether a taking has
occurred. In Williamson County Regional

Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 32
"[b]ecause respondent hard] not yet obtained a final decision regarding application of the zoning ordinance and
subdivision regulations to its property, nor
utilized the procedures Tennessee provide[d] for obtaining just compensation,"33 the Court reversed and remanded,
holding that the claim was not ripe for
appeal.
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Respondent did submit a plan for developing the property and the planning commission rejected the proposal, but instead
of following through with other remedies
(seeking variances from either the Board of
Zoning Appeals or the Commission)
respondent filed suit. There had not been
any determination that respondent had
been "denied all reasonable beneficial use
of its property, and therefore ... " there
was no final decision. 34
In United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc., 35 the Corps of Engineers filed
suit alleging that the disputed property
constituted wetlands. The issue centered
on the 1977 Federal Water Pollution Control Act amendment's, definition of
'waters of the United States,' (See 33
U.S.c. 1, 1344). The Supreme Court held
that neither the requirement for nor the
denial of a dredge and fill permit in and of
itself is a taking, since "there may be other
viable uses available to the owner."36 In a
footnote the Court indicated that respondent may have a temporary taking claim as
a result of the Corps' denial of the fill permit, but, under the Tucker Act, 28 U .S.c.
§ 1491, the property owner should
"initiate a suit for compensation in the
Claims Court."37
In MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo
County,38 Appellant sought to subdivide
property into 159 single-family and multifanlily residential lots. The Yolo County
Planning Commission rejected this plan
on grounds that the proposal failed to provide adequate public street access, sewer
services, water supplies, and police protection. Finding that all administrative procedures had not been exhausted and holding
that the complaint failed to state cause of
action upon which relief could be
granted,39 the Court declined to reach the
taking issue, because the "appellant has
submitted one subdivision proposal and
has received the Board's response thereto.
Nevertheless, appellant still has yet to
receive the Board's final, definitive position regarding how it will apply the regulations at issue to the particular land in
question."40 There thus exists the possibility that some development may be permitted, but until a final determination is
reached as to whether a taking has occurred, the taking issue will not be addressed. 41
In 1987, the Supreme Court decided
three taking cases. Controversy surrounded two of the cases because of the Court's
vacillation as to which taking test the
Court would apply in a given case. The
least controversial taking issue was
addressed in Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis. 42 In Keystone, Section
4 of Pennsylvania's Bituminous Mine Sub-

sidence and Land Conservation Act (Act)
was challengedY The Act prohibited mining that causes subsidence damage 44 to
public
buildings,
dwellings,
and
cemeteries.45 The statute was analyzed by
deciding whether it substantially advanced
a legitimate state interest and whether it
denied the owner an economically viable
use of his land. 46
In deciding the first issue, the Court analyzed the legislative purpose as specifically
stated in Section 2 of the Subsidence Act.
The Act is "for the protection of the
health, safety and general welfare ... by
providing for the conservation of surface
lands areas which may be affected in the
mining of bituminous coal," to preserve
water drainage and supplies, and "generally to improve the use and enjoyment of
such lands .... "47 Where the public
interest is to prevent an activity which is
similar to a public nuisance, then compensation is precluded. In this case, "[t]he Subsidence Act ... plainly seeks to further
such an interest."48

CCcompensation for a
temporary taking
was addressed in
First English ... "

Turning to the second issue, the Court
in Keystone found that Petitioner failed to
prove any substantial economic loss. Petitioner's suit was based on the theory that
the Act, on its face, was a taking. However, no evidence was produced concerning
the effect of the Act on Petitioner's mining
operation. The Court applied both a
diminution of value and reasonable beneficial use test, and found under each analysis
that there was no taking because Keystone
was not deprived of enough of its property
to prove a taking. 49 In reaching this conclusion, the Court looked at the amount of
coal that petitioners could not mine in
relation to the amount of coal it could
mine. The coal amounted to 27 million
tons, representing only 2% of the entire
coal deposit. 50
The question of compensation for a temporary taking was addressed in First

English Evangelical Lutheran Church of

Glendale v. County ofLos Angeles. 51 In First
English, the church had a campground
known as Lutherglen which was destroyed
by a flood. As a result of the flood damage,
Los Angeles County adopted Ordinance
No. 11,855 in order to preserve the public
health and safety.52 The ordinance prohibited any type of construction, reconstruction or enlargement of any building
located within the interim flood protection area. 53 Petitioner filed suit claiming it
lost all use of Lutherglen and sought
damages as relief. Both the trial court and
the California Court of Appeals struck
this allegation holding that the California
Supreme Court's decision in Agins v.
Tiburon 54 precluded compensation for a
temporary taking of property until after
the issue was decided by way of declaratory relief or mandamus. 55
The Court made only a limited holding
because two questions, whether the questioned ordinance actually denied appellant
all of its property and whether any denial
of such use may be allowed under the
State's authority to enact safety regulations, remained unanswered. 56 According
to the Court, the Just Compensation
Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution requires compensation
to run from the time a regulation takes
effect and "no subsequent action by the
government can relieve it of the duty to
provide compensation for the period during which the taking was effective."57
In First English, the allegations in the
complaint were treated as true for the purpose of Supreme Court review. Thus, it
was "assume[d] that the Los Angeles
County ordinances ... denied appellant
all use of its property for a considerable
period
of years
and . . . invalidation . . . without payment of fair value
for the use of the property during this
period of time would be a constitutionally
insufficient remedy."58
As a result of the Court's decision, the
church had to prove that either the
ordinance deprived it of all reasonable use
during the time period, causing more than
a mere diminution of value 59 or the restrictions on its property were such that the
general public enjoyed a benefit' greater
than the burden placed on the property
owner.60 On the other hand, the county
could defeat the church's taking allegation
by proving that the church did not lose all
reasonable uses of the property61 or the
effect of the statute was to prevent a public
harm which outweighed any inconvenience to the property owner. 62
Nollan v. California Coastal Commis·
sion, 63 involved a request for a building
permit by the Nollans to replace their
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small beachfront bungalow with a much
larger structure. The permit was granted
by the Commission upon the condition
that an easement be gra."1ted to the state
which would allow the public lateral
access across Nollan's beachfront property
along the shoreline. 64 Because of the "lack
of [a] nexus between the condition and the
original purpose of the building restriction[,] ... the permit condition ... [was]
not a valid regulation of land use .... "65
The majority rejected the Commission's
finding that the new house would interfere
with "visual access to the beach."66
Instead, the Court held that any asserted
public interest in a strip of beach must be
accomplished by eminent domain and not
by use of a permit system.67
Justice Brennan, writing for the dissent,
argued that the majority erroneously analyzed the case. Brennan believed that this
was not a case of physical intrusion by the
state, but instead a rational exercise of a
state's police power. 68 Even if a more exacting match is required, Brennan argued
"the impression that the beach is not open
to the public - is thus directly alleviated by
the provision for public access over the
dry sand."69
The Nollan case is similar to First English
in that the petitioner may have won the
battle, but not the war. Despite the
Court's holding that the permit may not
be conditioned with the easement requirement, Nollan may still lose control over
the beach if a later trial court determines
that the public has obtained a prescriptive
right to the beach.7°
TESTS APPLIED BY THE COURTS
What has evolved over the years as a
result of the preceeding Supreme Court
decisions seems to be a general state of confusion regarding the applicable test in a
taking case. While this may be true in that
the Court has not stated "this will be the
test," what has evolved are various standards which the Court can apply, depending upon the facts of a particular case. The
Court has not strayed from the general distinctions between eminent domain and
police power regulations in that any physical entry will be subject to eminent
domain rules and analysis and thus could
require just compensation.? I Essentially,
four tests have evolved to decide taking by
regulation cases: (1) diminution in value;
(2) reasonable beneficial use; (3) creation or
prevention of harm; and (4) burden and
benefit.
DIMINUTION OF VALUE
The diminution of value test was established in Mahon and "requires compensation only if the value of the land is

excessively diminished .... "72
The analysis focuses on two points.
First, does the statute or regulation serve a
valid public purpose? Second, if there is a
valid public purpose, what is its effect on
this particular property? Thus, under this
first test a property owner must lose all use
of the property in order to prevail.
REASONABLE BENEFICIAL USE
The reasonable beneficial use test analyzes
the facts of a particular case so as to ascertain if the property owner has any other
use of the property under the regulation.
Generally, if some other use can be found,
the court will often find no taking.73
Therefore, under the reasonable beneficial use test, if a property owner is seeking
to use the property to the fullest extent
possible, a court can find no taking. Additionally, as long as a property owner has
some reasonable use no taking will be
found.
CREATION OR PREVENTION
OF HARM
Consideration of the statute's or regulation's effect is the focus of the second test.
If the statute has the intended purpose of
preventing a public danger, or harm to the
public interest then it is seen as a police
power regulation.?4

"four tests have
evolved to decide
taking by
regulation .. "

The third test embraces the prevention
of environmental degradation as a basis of
its reasoning. If a property owner's plan
would detrimentally change the natural
environment then the request would be
denied. Thus, the state would be using the
police power to prevent a harm to the
entire society.
BURDEN AND BENEFIT
The last test considers whether the
restrictions imposed upon the property
owner allow the general public to enjoy
the benefits of the protected resource.75 In

order for a plaintiff to succeed in this type
of case, he has the responsibility of showing that the burden on his property exceeds the normal requirements of a zoning
regulation.
Thus, the fourth test has more of a balancing formula as its focus. Both property
owners and society must balance their respective rights. When one party attempts
to place too great a burden on the other
party, then this extra benefit accruing to
the other party will be disallowed.
SUMMARY
What then do these tests mean? How are
they to be applied in a possible taking case?
Perhaps, the four tests could be consolidated into two. First, the diminution of
value and reasonable beneficial use tests are
both very similar in that for a plaintiff to
succeed under the diminution of value test
he must prove that he has lost all possible
use of his property. Under the reasonable
beneficial use test, the court, in order not
to find a taking, need only recognize that
the property has some minimal use. Therefore, using the above reasoning, a taking
under the police powers would only occur
when the regulation deprives the landowner of all reasonable use of his property.
This theory is very anti-property owner
because some minimal use could probably
be found in every case.
Second, the last two tests could also be
combined. The harm test looks at the
property in its natural character and any
drastic change to that natural state is considered harmful to the environment and
the surrounding ecosystem. The burden
and benefit test has as its basis a balancing
of the burden the regulation places on the
owner versus the benefit the state or general public receives by leaving the property
in its natural state. Consequently, a taking
would not occur where the purpose of the
regulation is to preserve the land in its
natural state, unless the regulation puts too
great a burden on the owner to keep the
land in its organic form. Therefore, some
form of tax credits or other benefits accruing to the property owner could help to
lessen this burden and avoid a taking
without just compensation problem.
CHESAPEAKE BAY
CRITICAL AREA LEGISlATION
AND THE TAKING TESTS
In 1984, the Maryland General
Assembly added to Maryland National
Resources Code Annotated Title 8, Water
and Water Resources subtitle 18,
Chesapeake Bay Critical Area Protection
Program 55 8-1801 et. seq. The stated purpose was to "[e]stablish a Resource Protection Program '" by fostering more sen-
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sltive development activity for certain
shoreline areas so as to minimize damage
to water quality and natural habitats; and
[i]mplement the ... [p]rogram on a cooperative basis between the State and affected
local governments .... "76
The Chesapeake Bay Critical Area consists of:
(1) [a]ll waters of land under the
Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries to
the head of tide as indicated on the
State wetlands maps, and all State and
private wetlands designated under
Title 9 of this article; and
(2) [a]ll land and water areas within
1,000 feet beyond the landward boundaries of State or private wetlands and
the heads of tides designated under
Title 9 of this article. 77
With the enactment of this legislation,
landowners who wished to develop their
property were faced with another predevelopment requirement which stated
that:
[T]he approving authority of the local
jurisdiction in rendering its decision to
approve an application shall make
findings that:
(1) [t]he proposed development will
minimize adverse impact on water
quality ... and;
(2) ... has identified fish, wildlife,
and plant habitat which may be
adversely affected ... and has designed
the development ... to protect those
identified habitats ... .7 8
As a result of this section, the Act would
seem to be open for a challenge that it is a
taking on its face. Maryland case law does
not give a prospective plaintiff much hope.
In Potomac Sand,79 plaintiff was denied the
ability to dredge, take and carry away sand
and gravel from the tidal waters or marshes
of Charles County. The Court of Appeals
of Maryland held that the Act was not an
unconstitutional taking on its face because
"Chapter 792 has an ecological purpose.
As has been shown, the protection of
exhaustible natural resources is a valid
exercise of the police powers."80
In light of a possible suit under a taking
theory, the Critical Areas legislation
should be analyzed under the four generally accepted tests used by the Supreme
Court. According to the diminution of
value test, a plaintiff must prove that the
land has lost all valuable use. Section 81813,81 comes closest to possibly depriving
a landowner of all possible use. This is not
necessarily the case since a property owner
might be denied the highest and best use,

but not all use.
The reasonable beneficial use test which
requires analysis directed to whether or
not the owner has any other use for the
property would apply to two sections of
the Act. The first section (8-1808(c) Elements of Program), does not disallow all
uses because zoning could be changed that
would allow for other economic useS. 82
The second section (8-1809(g) Proposed
Amendments) allows the local jurisdictions to propose amendments, which must
be approved by the Commission according
to the standards set forth by the legislation. B3 Thus, the restrictions on development would not be permanent.
The best argument the state could use in
a taking suit would be under the third test,
prevention of harm. The title of the legislation speaks for itself as to the intent of the
Act, "Chesapeake Bay Critical Area Pro·
tection Program." (emphasis added). Section 8-1801 (Declaration of Public Policy)
includes findings by the General Assembly
which in essence declare that the
Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries have
been and continue to be harmed by human
activity. As a result of the deterioration of
the Chesapeake Bay, the intent of the Act
is to minimize any future adverse
impacts.84

CCthe restrictions on
development would
not be permanent."

The burden and benefit test could also
be used by the state because "[t]he quality
of life for the citizens of Maryland is
enhanced through the restoration of the
quality and productivity of the waters of
the Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries."85
Continuing under subsection nine, the Act
recites that "[t]here is a critical and substantial State interest for the benefit of current and future generations in fostering
more sensitive development activity ... so
as to minimize damage to water quality
and natural habitats."86
There is no doubt that all the citizens of
Maryland will benefit in the prevention of
future damage to the Chesapeake Bay and
its tributaries. Looking at the law on its

face, there does not seem to be any extra
burden on a landowner since the program
anticipates "policies for development in
the Chesapeake Bay Critical Area which
accomodates growth .... "87
Therefore, the probability that the Act
on its face would be declared unconstitutional as a taking without just compensation seems very remote. However, that
does not rule out the possibility of individual law suits challenging the Act as
applied to a specific situation. Estimating
the possible success of such a suit without
specific facts would be very presumptuous
at this stage. The Act appears to have an
answer for each of the taking theories,
however, any final interpretation rests
with the Maryland Court of Appeals and
possibly the United States Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION
Since the Supreme Court decided, in
Mahon that a "regulation that goes too far
will be recognized as a taking," the courts
and the legal community have not yet
been able to define what constitutes
unreasonable infringement of property
rights. The police power of the state is
used to protect and prevent harm to the
public health, safety, welfare and morals of
society. Environmental regulation is the
most recent extension of the police power.
Since the 1970's, the judiciary has been
more willing to uphold police power
regulatory legislation because of newly cultivated public concern with the environment and man's interrelationship with
nature.
Maryland's Chesapeake Bay Critical
Area legislation is another attempt to
assuage the damage caused by man's past
greed and disregard for natural resources.
Unless the Act denies a property owner of
total use of his land, the Critical Area program will probably not be considered a taking without just compensation.
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was a taking by physical intrusion); see gener·
ally Coston is, Presumptive and Per Se
Takings: A Decisional Model for tbe Taking
Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 465 (1983).
31 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426.
32 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985).
J3 Id. at 3117.
14 Id. at 312l.
H
106 S. Ct. 455 (1985).
36 Id. at 459.
10

37

Id. at 460 n.6.

38

106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986).

3. Id. at 2566.
.0 Id. at 2568.
., Id.
.2

107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).

.3

Id. at 1237.

.. !d. at 1236.
Id. at 1237.
•• !d. at 1242.
45

47

Id.

.8

!d. at 1246.

•• Id. at 1249.
50 Id.
51
51

.,

..

55
56
57

58

5.
60

61

61
63

..
65
.6
67

..

6'

70
71

72

73

H

75

76

77
78

7.
80

81

82

107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
Id. at 238l.
Id. at 2382.
24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr.
372 (1979), aff'd on otber grounds, 447 U.S.
255 (1980); See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
107 S. Ct. at 2384.
Id. at 2384-85.
Id. at 2389.
Id.
See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
See infra note 75 and accompanying text.
See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
Id. at 3143.
Id. at 3148.
Id. at 3149.
Id. at 3150.
Id. at 3151 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 3155.
Id. at 316l.
See supra notes 14-18, 30-31; but see supra
notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
3 Rohan at 17-28 to 17-29, see also
Hadacbeck v. Sebastian, supra note 5 (87.5%
decrease-no compensation).
See supra notes 9-13 and 19-23 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 3-4, 42-50 and accompanying
text; if. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369
U.S. 590 (1962); see generally 3 Rohan at 1731 to 17-32; 7 Rohan at 52A-11 to 52A-12.
See supra notes 9-23 and accompanying text;
see generally 3 Rohan at 17-32.
Md. Nat. Res. Code Ann. S 8-1801(b)(1)(2)
(1984, ch. 794).
Id. at S 8-1807(a)(1)(2).
Id. at S 8-1813(a)(1)(2).
266 Md. 358, 293 A.2d 241 (per curiam),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1040 (1972).
293 A.2d at 251; see also Bureau of Mines of
Maryland v. George's Creek Coal & Land Co.,
272 Md. 143, 321 A.2d 748.
See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
Subsection (c) in pertinent part states: "At a
minimum, a program sufficient to meet the
goals stated in subsection (b) includes:
(3) As necessary, new or amended provisions
of the jurisdiction's;
(4) Provisions as appropriate relating to
grand fathering of development at the time
the program is adopted ... ;
(5) [E]ncourage cluster development ... ;
(6) Establishment of buffer areas along shorelines within which agriculture will be permitted ... ;
(7) [S]etback for structures and septic fields
along shorelines;
(8) Designation of shoreline areas if any that
are suitable for parks, hiking, biking, wildlife
refuges, scenic drives, public access or
assembly, and water-related recreation such
as boat slips, piers, and beaches;
(9) [S]horeline areas ... that are suitable for
ports, marinas, and industries that ... derive
economic benefits from shore access."

83

..

85
86
87

S 8-1809 in pertinent part states:
"(g) Proposed amendments. - Each local jurisdiction shall review and propse any necessary amendments to its program, including
local zoning maps, at least every 4 years.
(h) Program not to be amended without approval of Commission. - A program may
not be amended except with the approval of
the Commission.
(i) Standards for approval by Commission. the Commission shall approve programs and
amendments that meet:
(1) the standards set forth in S 8-1808(b)(1)
through (3) of this subtitle; and
(2) the criteria adopted by the Commission
under S 8-1808 of this subtitle."
S 8-1801 in pertinent part states:
"(a) Findings. - The General Assembly
finds and declares that: (1) The Chesapeake
Bay and its tributaries are natural resources
of great significance to the State and the nation;
(2) [C]onstitute a valuable, fragile, and sensitive part of this estuarine system ... ;
(3) The capacity ... to withstand the continuing demands upon them, without further
degradation to water quality and natural habitats is limited;
(4) National studies have documented that
the quality and productivity of the
waters ... and its tributaries have declined ... ;
(5) Those portions of the Chesapeake Bay
and its tributaries within Maryland are particularly stressed by the continuing population growth and development ... ;
(7) The restoration of the Chesapeake Bay
and its tributaries is dependent, in part, on
minimizing further adverse impacts ... ;
(8) The cumulative impact of current development in [sic] inimical to these purposes .... "
Md. Nat. Res. Code Ann. § 8-1801(a)(6).
Id. at § 8-1801(a)(9).
Id. at S 8-1808(b)(3).
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